

2 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Zero Base Review of Compartmented Clearances

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI from [ ] dtd 20 December 1978; same subject

1. In referenced memorandum the DCI approved a recommendation authorizing the Director of Security to defer the zero base review product (SI and TK) clearances until the implementation phase of the APEX program, but instructing him to complete the zero base review for holders of operational clearances [ ]

2. This calls for actions on our part among which are:

a. Preparation of a new memorandum for signature of the D/Security revising previous instructions per the above recommendation.

b. Assisting the individuals tasked with the review to gain an appreciation of what the new APEX system will accomplish. (Without this appreciation, the review could be premised on current procedures and regulations ending up with a less drastic reduction in numbers of these special access approvals than might be otherwise accomplished).

3. In connection with the above, I met with [ ] on Friday, 29 December and shared this position with him. He informed that there has been no action within CIA to date to

implement the zero base review. He noted that there was an MBO objective for SSC to do some contractors but not all of them. He concurred in my observation and proposed a meeting be scheduled on Thursday in the D/Security Conference Room of principals that will be involved in the review of operational access approvals. Among these individuals he mentioned [redacted] I would add [redacted] and anyone else you can think of. To try to get the spirit of APEX across, I suggested that I try to get [redacted] to address the group. [redacted] concurred. Would you call individuals. I'll contact Mr. [redacted]

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4. Attached are some thoughts that may be of interest as we discuss APEX and the required zero base review.

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Attachment

2 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chief, Community Security Group

The following ideas are listed as interpretations and ramifications of [REDACTED] effort to revise our compartmentation program. They are subject to revision following subsequent discussions. They appear worthy of consideration now in that they may effect the development of procedures for implementing the revision of our compartmentation program.

1. Compartmentation Control System for Operational Activities:

It is acknowledged that operational, R&D and programming activities of technical system used to collect intelligence should be compartmented as necessary to protect them from inadvertant negative impact through loss of information control about them. However, the present names of systems of protection, e.g., COMINT-HVCCO, [REDACTED] Systems and Channels, [REDACTED] and its channels will be replaced. They will no longer exist as we know them now. There will be just one compartmentation system and one compartmented channel. It is currently called APEX although that name may be changed later.

Thresholds are being developed to determine what will be placed in the [REDACTED] operational category. It is believed that there will be a category of operational material called [REDACTED] They will require approval for access.

With little exception for those in direct support or assigned to these projects there should be no reason for anyone within government circles to have access to these projects.

The names will be unclassified and use in a memorandum will not serve as grounds for placing this memorandum in compartmented channels.

Holders of this access approvals will be nominated by SIO's. Approval for access will be the responsibility of the national office or program director. In the event of disagreement, a third element will resolve the conflict.

Operational projects, R&D, will be primarily in industrial areas. Contracts will include statements about numbers of personnel who require access to do the job.

In view of these concepts, it should be possible to eliminate the need for almost all holders of [ ] clearances in government from the list of candidates. STAT

Those individuals in government who require access to some operational data such as photo interpreters, cryptographers, analysts will be provided information about operational projects in the form of material prepared by the program manager which program managers will release from their operational control. If this is not feasible then it will be necessary to make sub-compartments of operational data a la [ ] Holders of such subcompartmented information will be nominated and approved by the SIO. Information in the subcompartments will be prepared by the project officers in sufficient detail to satisfy needs of the interpreter, cryptographer and analysts. Subcompartments will be identified with a suffice word or letter, e.g., . STAT

STAT [ ]  
A criteria for access approvals in the APEX system will be a requirement to receive APEX material.

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